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1. A special issue of Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics devoted to Hannah 
Arendt (1906-1975) in a period of heavy inflation of secondary literature and 
memorial celebrations might appear both pretentious and superfluous. Of 
course, we hope it is not. Yet, a condition must be met, i.e. to resist the 
temptation of setting out an immediate, simple answer to the question of 
how much of Arendt’s thought and work is still alive today. Partly, since 
fame — something the author of Vita activa certainly does not lack — is 
often a deceptive mirror, as Arendt herself was well aware of. And partly, 
since an immediate answer would imply the resort to such concepts as 
Zeitgemässigkeit and Unzeitgemässigkeit which, despite their glorious 
nitzschean echoes, seem too vague and obscure to be really useful in the 
present case.  
The title of this monographic issue tries to suggest something that might 
be worth noting. That is, if we are able to focus a tension that dwells in the 
core of Arendt’s work, then we are also in a better position to appreciate the 
controversial nature of her influence on contemporary debates. Besides, all of 
this may also be useful in order to understand why an interdisciplinary 
approach is something more than one possible editorial choice among many 
other available options. Most of recent scholarly literature on Hannah 
Arendt clearly shows that an interaction of different competences has become 
increasingly necessary, if we are to grasp the many facets of a thought that 
cannot be simply labelled as ‘political theory’ anymore. Needless to say, we 
do not mean to deny, nor to retrench the political quality of Arendt’s 
biographical and intellectual itinerary. Just the opposite. In order to make 
the most of it, as well as in order to bring into discussion some of its features 
far from being thoroughly convincing, an enquiry on the theoretical and 
cultural background lying behind her political thought is requested.   
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2. A peculiar tension between past and present shapes, first of all, the way 
Arendt confronts the history of philosophy. Philosophical and political 
thinking seems to be possibile for her only through an ceaseless dialogue with 
some classical auctores who have nurtured her youthful years and, at the 
same time, provided that the auctores in question do not change in 
overwhelming auctoritates. In other words, according to Arendt western 
cultural past deserves to be explored only to the extent it casts a light on the 
present, and not as a place where a deeper, higher, truth is kept.  
The first of the essays presented here, by Giovanni Catapano, makes sense 
of this point by discussing Arendt’s reading of Augustine. As for many other 
Heidegger’s disciples, the bishop of Hippo crosses Arendt’s intellectual 
horizon from the very beginnning to the end of her career. Along the lines of 
a rigorous philological approach, Catapano compares chapter 6 of Arendt’s 
The Life of the Mind with Hans Jonas’s Augustine and the Pauline Problem of 
Freedom. The analysis focuses on a theme, the will and its antinomies, whose 
importance in the general economy of Arendt’s political philosophy hardly 
needs to be remarked. Catapano underlines the fact that, while Jonas thinks 
Augustine loses the pauline antinomical structure of the will during the 
pelagian controversy, Arendt emphazises the augustinian philosophical 
illustration of the split that paralyzes the will. A genuine theoretical interest 
in a possibile solution to the dialectics left open by Augustine’s Confessiones 
makes Arendt’s attention shift towards De Trinitate, where the will, once 
turned into charity, becomes a cohesive force capable of sustaining the claims 
of action. Another important difference between Jonas and Arendt concerns 
the concept of freedom: according to Jonas, the genuine nature of the 
question is missed by Augustine since the bishop of Hippo developes it within 
a compatibilistic framework. Arendt, instead, finds in Augustine’s De civitate 
Dei some elements closely related to her concept of freedom as natality; in a 
way, its pre-history. But natality as primary source of action, in Catapano’s 
view, is an original arendtian concept that cannot be really found in 
Augustine. 
This kind of manipulation of the augustinian texts could raise the 
impression that Arendt’s philosophical and political ideas tend to evolve at 
the expense of a genuine understanding of her auctores. Beyond any doubt, 
Arendt is a deliberately malicious historian of philosophy. Given the premises 
previuosly outlined, this is not amazing at all. Nevertheless, to consider 
Arendt as a victim of a resounding misunderstanding would be completely 
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out of place, according to Deborah Ardilli, as far as her reading of Kant is 
concerned. Surely, Arendt’s insistence on a kantian «unwritten political 
philosophy» — i.e. a political philosophy that has to be found in his whole 
work and not just in the few essays that are usually collected under this 
rubric — overcomes orthodox scholarly perspectives. But it would be 
misleading to draw the conclusion that her unusual point of view involves a 
forgery. To put it simply: in accordance with the broad sense of the term 
‘politics’ she adopts, Arendt aims at exploring the political meaning of 
criticism as a whole. Along the way, she finds in kantian cosmpolitical 
philosophy, inclusive of a new pragmatical approach to anthropology, an ally 
in her engagement against her former mentor Martin Heidegger. Moreover, 
the role played by Kant in the making of Arendt’s philosophy can be fully 
appreciated if related to the problem of Modernity. On the one hand, in fact, 
criticism as a whole is the theoretical expression of Modernity; on the other 
hand, Modernity is a field of historical and political contradictions that 
Arendt faces provided with a critical framework that differentiates her from 
conservative detractors of Modernity, as well as from post-modern theorists.  
If it is true, as Ardilli suggests, that Kant’s Anthropologie in pragmatischer 
Hinsicht is an important source of inspiration for the Jewish philosopher, 
then we should not be surprised that experts in twentieth century German 
philosophical anthropology have felt deeply solicited by Arendt’s work. One 
of them, Maria Teresa Pansera, offers a detailed reconstruction of Arendt’s 
idea of human condition. As the Italian scholar points out, Arendt tries to 
achieve a definition of what being in the world means based neither on 
scientific knowledge, nor on pure philosophical elaborations as proposed by 
Husserl or by Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Rather, by focusing on the 
problems raised by the question “who is man?”, Arendt deliberately rejects 
the question of what man is. This is the reason why her theory of human 
action can be considered one the major premises of her political thought. And 
this is the reason why, as Pansera puts it, Arnold Gehlen was both interested 
in and critical of Arendt’s theory of human action. As a matter of fact, on the 
one hand Gehlen highlights those features of Arendt’s analysis of technical-
scientific civilatizion that come closest to his concept of man. On the other 
hand, Gehlen’s biological interpretation of action as a means for human 
survival and institutional stabilization makes him highly suspicious towards 
Arendt’s “utopian” connection between action, freedom and public realm. 
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Whether utopian or not, it is out of question that Arendt’s view of human 
condition contrasts with any kind — biological or cultural — of essentialist 
reductionism. Seen in the light of its historical effects, reductionism is the 
logical step that has preceded a mass production of human superfluity, as the 
suggestive portrait of Arendt as post-totalitarian thinker outlined by 
Antonella Argenio goes to show. Related to the conflicts involved in a post-
totalitarian world, the special emphasis the Jewish philosopher lays on the 
relational status of freedom and action can be read, as it is explained by 
Davide Sparti, as a «non identitary theory of identity». The consequence of 
all this is that not only do Arendt’s notions of action and human plurality 
outgrow a vision of collective and individual identity as an exogenous, 
isolated, motionless object ontologically preceding concrete social 
intercourses. They cast a different light on the concept of Anerkennung as 
well. Sparti underlines this aspect by setting Arendt’s theory of human 
action against Charles Taylor’s and Axel Honneth’s identiy politcs of 
recognition. That is, if we take seriously the idea of plurality, then we should 
be able to see some of the shortcomings that affect current normative 
theories of recognition. A fully accomplished recognition, according to Sparti, 
is a dangerous goal to be pursued, since it might become the premise for a 
reductionist view deaf to a basilar element of human freedom: the 
unforeseeable, and consequently unprojectable, outcomes of recognition. This 
is just what Taylor and Honneth seem to forget: to recognize a once for all 
shaped identity means to recognize something that concrete human beings 
are not — and should not aim at being.  
Did Hannah Arendt herself take seriously the concept of plurality? Does 
her vision of political power fit in with plurality? These are the challenging 
questions raised by Ferdinando Menga in the last of the essays presented 
here. According to Menga, Arendt’s political thought rests on an intransitive 
understanding of power, which can be fully grasped if compared with Max 
Weber’s transitive interpretation of the same phenomenon. Otherwise said, 
while a weberian understanding of political power is open to individual 
initiatives within the community, Arendt’s view of “acting in concert” seems 
to suggest that the qualified subject of power is always and only the 
community as a whole. This is the reason why she opposes to political 
representation and opts for direct democracy, betraying along this path  her 
vision of plurality. Is there any remedy for this outcome? In Menga’s 
opinion, by retrieving the concept of political representation and by 
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rethinking its theoretical structure, we could also recover the irreducible 
dimension of plurality. 
 
 
3. Let’s bring to an end these introductory remarks. Past and present, unity 
and plurality, the individual and the world, identity and difference, freedom 
and its limitations: Hannah Arendt has had the venture, which she 
considered a privilege, to reflect upon all these contradictions in a period 
when their politicization was not a stain to be removed from philosophical 
work. Present days are for many respects quite different. Certainly, conflicts 
are still on the scene; what seems to be more and more difficult is articulating 
a form through which they can be made visible and intelligible. Arendt used 
to call “acosmism” this lack of mediation, where the common world seems to 
disappear from our sight and plurality just stops to make sense. Moreover, 
she knew that however mediation was to be redifined in the future, it could 
no longer be on the old terms. Deciding whether Hannah Arendt is our 
contemporary or not, and in case to what extent, is completely up to the 
reader. Being the question still worth arising, is what the following pages try 
to show.   
